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ABSTRACT
Using optimal control theory and a vector autoregressive
representation of the relationship between money and interest
rates, one can derive a feedback control procedure which defines
the best possible tradeoff between interest rate volatility and
money supply fluctuations and which could be used to reduce both
from their current levels.
Robert B. Litterman




The debate over the proper conduct of monetary policy has intensi-
fied in recent years as the Federal Reserve has focused its attention on
reducing inflation by controlling the rate of growth of the money supply.
Although most observers give the Federal Reserve credit for reducing the trend
growth of money, n.nyhavecriticized it for having increased the short run
variability of moneygrowthrates and the volatility of interest rates. The
Federal Reserve is currently searching for procedures which will guarantee
control over the trend growth of money, while at the same time reducing the
short run fluctuations in both money and interest rates.This paper uses
optinl control theory and a time series representation for money and interest
rates to derive a feedback control procedure which defines the best possible
tradeoff between interest rate volatility and money supply fluctuations and
which could be used to reduce both from their current levels. The organi—
zation of the paper is as follows:section 2 reviews the control theory
framework, section 3 describes the use of a time series model to represent the
dynamicbehavior of the system, section 1presents the application to short—
run control of the money supply, and a final section addresses the key issue
of structuralstability.—2—
2. OPTIMALCONTROLTHEORY
OptimalControlTheory is a well developed set of mathmetical tools
used primarily by engineers to solve problems involving a dynamical system
which responds to exosenous inputs.These same tools are used here to gene-
ratea rule for targeting interest rates in order to balance optimally the
competing goals of controlling the supply of money and reducing the volatility
of interest rates.
In its usual form, optimal linear control theory specifies an algo—
ritbmfor setting one or more inputs in order to minimize a quadratic loss
function.This result, and other cited below, can be found in any standard
control theory text, such as Kwakernak and Sivan (1972) or Chow (1976). The
key elements in the optimal control problem are as follows:
The State: A vector of variables which contains all relevant information
concerning the current state of the system.In particular, the State
vector includes all variables which enter the loss function directly, and
all other variables which help to predict their values.
The Laws of Motion: A difference equation which determines the state at
time t as a function of the previous state, a vector of inputs called the
control, and a disturbance vector. The dynamical system with its assoc-
iated laws of motion is often referred to as "the plant."
The Control: A vector of inputs which can be set by the controller in
order to affect the future course of the state.
The Loss Function: A function specifying the criterion to be optimized in
the setting of the control. Often the loss function includes a target or
path of desired values for one or more components of the state.
Twotypesof control are differentiated by whether or not the con-
trol responds to the current state of the system. If the control is preset,
the control is referred to as "open loop." If the control is adjusted each
period in order to respond to the current state, then the system is said to be
operating under "feedback control."Feedback control loops have several
desirable properties relative to open ioop control.A feedback controller
compensates for disturbances, allowing the control to be much more—3—
effective.Futhermore, an unstable system can be stabilized by feedback
control, a characteristic which cannot be obtained by open loop control.
Finally, the effect of system parameter variation can be greatly reduced by
continually updating the contol. This is of particular importance in the case
of economic systems for which there is likely to be paramenter variation and a
high degree of parameter uncertainty.
The control design is generally based on the following sequence of
events. At time t—l the state vector determines everything that is needed to
predict the future course of the system.The controller observes this state
and determines the optimal setting for the control which will impinge on the
system at time t.The state of the system at time t is a function of the
state at time t—l, the control at time t, and a disturbance vector which




Finding the optimal setting of the control,given the laws of motion
of thesystem and a particular lOSS function is generally a very difficult
problem.However, for the particular case of a system whose laws of motion
are linear and for which the loss function is quadratic, the problem has been
solved. Under mild regularity conditions, a computational procedure known as
"iterating on a matrix Riccati equation,'t leads to the optimal linear control
target
state vector_1. —
rule. Whiletheoptimal control rule which solves the linear, quadratic
problem may not be optimal relative to a more general foruilation of the
problem, in practice it is likely to be the best solution available.
The textbook application of control theory to monetary policy
assumes that the Fed can control either money or interest rates
perfect1r.' The question at issue is which variable the Fed should con-
trol, and how it should set that variable so as to achieve a full employment,
stable price path for the econoxrr.This standard application is not the
problem which we are addressing. We bring it up here to illustrate a typical





USUAL APPLICATION TO MONETARYPOLICY
The focus of this paper is more narrow than the usual textbook
application in that no attent is made to derive an optimal monetary policy.
It is assumed here that the money target path is known. However, rather than
taking as given the ability of the Fed to hit its money supply target, this
-JSee, for example, Sargent (1979), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and







paperinvestigates the Fed's short run problem of attempting to control the
money supply. For the purpose of this paper, the monetary target in a given
week is that week's value for the level of N—i which is on a long run trend
growth path adopted by the Fed. The Fed is assumed to use open market opera-
tions to try to keep M—1 as close to the trend as feasible, on average. The
open market operations, b,r increasingor decreasing the supply of reserves,
causethe federal fundsrateto go downorup, respectively. These movements
in the federal funds rate will cause banks and other economic agents to adjust
their portfolios, leading to predictable movements inthestock of money. We
do not attempt to model the open market operations directly, instead, we focus
on the levels of the federal funds rate which emerge each week and their
effects on subsequent movements in money.In the control procedure modeled
here the Fed receives, at the end of the week, the latest figures for M—l
(data for the week ending two weeks earlier), and decides on a new desired
level for the funds rate for the following week. Other procedures and timing
relationships could easily be modeled in a similar manner. In particular, we
will later discuss, in turn, the applicability of this procedure to a funds
rate target, in which the Fed can basically set its targeted funds rate, and
to a reserves target, in which the Fed supplies reserves consistent with its
chosen funds rate, but does not offset shocks which may cause significant
deviations within a given week. A diagram of the short—run control appli-
cation is shown below.
APPLICATIONTO SHORT-RUN CONTROL OF MONETARYAGGFEGPES
money,interest rates




Itis assumed that the Fed knows the dynamic response pattern of
money and interest rates and uses this knowledge to set the funds rate so that
the money supply will stay near its target path. In the next section we will
address the question of estimating the necessary response patterns. Because
the money supply is subject to random disturbances, the best the Fed can do is
to cause the expected value of money to be on target each week. However, in
order to achieve this level of accuracy with respect to money, the Fed might
have to ke large changes in the funds rate each week. The required changes
might easily increase over time, leading to explosive oscillations in interest
rates.This is the instrument instability problem suggested by Holbrook
(1912).In fact, the Fed does not try to bring the expected value of the
money supply onto its target path each week. Rather, it is assumed to recog-
nize a short—run tradeoff between reducing expected deviations of money from
its target path and reducing fluctuations in interest rates.In order to
investigate the nature of that tradeoff we specify a loss function which has
terms penalizing both money supply deviations from target and volatility of
interest rates. These two objectives are assumed to capture the most impor-
tant tradeoff in the current Fed operating procedures.However, the lOSS
function could easily be generalized to include additional goals. It might be
desirable, for example, to avoid large interventions in the nrket, in which
case one could include a term representing a cost associated with the size of
the control itself.
Optimal control is most often expressed in the context of a first
order difference equation in the state vector.Let x(t) be an nxl state
vector, u(t) be the control, and w(t) be an nxl vector of disturbances. The
laws of motion of the system are given by
x(t) =Ax(t—l) + B u(t) + w(t) (1)—7—
whereA is an nxn matrix and B is an nxl vector. In order to fit the monetary
control problem into this framework, x(t) includes current and lagged values
of M—l, m(t), the federal funds rate, r(t), possibly other informational
variables, and a monetary target, M*(t). u(t) is the Fed controlled shock to
the funds rate. The matrix A includes two or more rows of estimated coeffic—
lents which define how M—l, the funds rate, and possibly other variables
evolve through time.All but one of the other rows of A identify as their
values in the previous state lags of m, r, and possibly other variables. The
final row defines the target money supply path.
The quadratic loss function is written as
L E{5[(M(t+s) —M*(t+s))2+ kl(t+_t+s_kfl2 (2)
where M*(t) is the desired path for M—l.The cost associated with money
deviations from target is balanced with interest rate volatility, measured as
a weighted sum of expected squared changes in the federal funds rate over
time.Different relative costs associated with deviations from the money
target path and interest rate volatility can be represented by different
values of A.More terms in the sum measuring interest rate volatility, that
is larger values of q, will lead to a smoother funds rate path. For example,
a high A, with q equal to one will avoid whipsawing the market——large move-
ments in the funds rate in a given week——while still allowing significant
movements over a period of time as short as say two or three months. A q of
ten or twelve, on the other hand, would damp considerably these longer swings
as well, leaving only very smooth changes in the funds rate over time. This
form for the loss function is only one of many possibilities. It was chosen
primarily because of its simplicity; the higher is q, the more it will respond
to, that is penalize, low frequency variations in interest rates. A more—8—
sophisticated loss function in the linear—quadratic class could be constructed
by n.king loss proportional to the square of particular linear combinations of
expected future interest rates, the linear combinations being chosen specific—
ally to respond to certain bands of frequencies of interest rate movements.
The loss function in (2) also includes a discount factor 8, which
allows the lOSS function to give relatively less weight to future losses than
to current losses.For the purposes of this paper there is no reason to
discount future losses, and the discount factor is taken to be 1.Although
the expected loss is not finite when the discount factor is 1, there is a well
defined feedback rule which is the limit as 8 goes to 1 of rules associated
with 8's less than 1 which do generate finite expected losses.In fact, it
may be not particularly desirable to have a finite expected loss; this
requires a discount factor less than 1, which is ropic in the sense that in a
steady state the average stream of losses will be larger than need be. This
occurs because the feedback rule does not look far enough ahead. For example,
if movements in interest rates affect money with a lag, and if we heavily
discount future losses, then we will be very reluctant to move interest rates
in any given period and our average loss each period will become very large
since money will deviate far from its target.
Given the environment described in (1) and the loss function (2),
optinl control theory answers the following question, "What is the linear
feedback rule for choosing u(t) which, on the basis of current information,
minimizes the expected future loss?" The solution is a feedback matrix, F,
and a rule
u(t) =Fx(t—1) (3)—9—
whichdetermines u(t) as a linear function of the past state and is optimal in
the sense that this choice of F generates a smaller expected loss than any
other choice.— 10—
3.TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
A critical element in optiml control theory is knowledge of the
dynamicbehavior of the system.Time series analysis, in particular the
application of vector autoregression techniques, provides a reliable estimate
ofthe laws of motionof the money market.
A special problem is encountered when optimal control theory is
applied to economic systems. A key element in the optimal control framework,
knowledge of the laws of motion of the system is either missing completely, or
known only with a large degree of uncertainty. Engineering texts on optimal
control spend little time considering this problem because it is usually
assumed that the response functions can be measured directly to whatever
degree of accuracy is needed. In economic systems itisimpossible to perform
controlled experiments in order to measure response functions.Instead,
economists have come to rely on the laws of motion linbedded in econometric
models.
Unfortunately,econometric models have generated a rather poor
record with respect to forecasting the response of the econonr to changes in
policy. For example, when a key econometric relationship, the Phillips curve,
was identified in the 1960's many economists?! claimed it could be used as the
basis for attempting to trade off higher inflation for lower unemployment.
After a decade of high inflation along with high unemployment, few would
suggest such an approach today. The rational expectations critique of stand-
ard econometric models provides a reasonable explanation of why those models
failed, and many economists have developed a cautious, if not skeptical,
attitude toward the use of control theory based on this approach.
&'See, for example, Tobin's (1972) AEA presidential address.— 11—
Atthe same time that this dissatisfaction with traditional econo-
metric models has been emerging, a number of economists including Christopher
Sims, Thomas Sargent, and staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
have been developing alternative time series methods of forecasting economic
variables .FNotall economists would feel comfortable applying these models
to the control framework, but a recent strong defense of a time series
approach to policy analysis is given by Sims (1982).He argues that the
normal business of policy formation is properly thought of as choice of shocks
to the policy behavior equation, and he goes on to suggest the use of a vector
autoregressive representation as the context in which this choice ought to be
made.
We follow Sims advice here and construct a vector autoregression
with M—1, the federal funds rate and other variables in order to represent the
laws of motion of the money market.In constructing this representation, we
have kept as a primaiy goal the desire to optimally forecast the movements of
M—l. For this reason we have paid particular attention to a statistic measur-
ing the out—of—sasrple forecasting performance of different models. We have
also followed the Bayesian procedures suggested by Litterman (1981) for fore-
casting with vector autoregressions.
In searching through a variety of different variables, looking for
those which help to predict weekly movements in seasonally adjusted M—l, the
federal funds rate clearly stood out as the most important. This was followed
at a considerable distance by the level of Commercial and Industrial Loans,
the Standard and Poors Index of 500 stocks, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed
Reserves, and Total Reserves. The Business Week Index, a conosite measure of
/Examp1esare in Sargent and Sims (1977), Anderson (1978), Sargent (1979),
Sims (1980), and Litter man (1981).— 12—
realactivity published by McGraw Hill, showed no explanatory power. Measures
of stock market volume and the Discount rate did not help either.These
results are based on experiments using systems with different sets of vari-
ables to forecast M—1.All systems were estimated using the same Bayesian
prior, which is described in detail below. The results of some of these tests
are given in Table 1 and displayed in Figures 1 and 2.
Table 1
Forecast Performance for M—1 and Federal Funds Rate








£4—i and Funds Rate 1.1302 51.9714
(3 variable systems
M—i, ftinds rate, and:
C & I Loans 1.1129 52.079
S&P Index 1.11149 51.728
BorrowedRes. 1.1230 52.567
Nonborrowed Res. i.l247 52.11414
Total Reserves 1.1262 51.619
Business Wk Index 1.13514 52.208
Discount Rate 1.1388 50.023
NYSE Volume 1.114114 51.312
The prediction error in Table 1 is an out—of—sample statistic. It is based on
residualscalculated by dropping, one ata time, each observation from the
sample and using the estimator so obtained to generate the residual for that
observation. The out—of—sample statistic is designed to distinguish variables
whichimprove the fit only in—sample, and those which actually explain out—of—
sample movements.The data are weekly observations from 1976:1 through
1982:12.
For the purpose of short run monetary control, the important aspectFigure 1
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ofthe estimated time series model is the response functionofM—1 to shocks
in the federal fundsrate.It is this response upon which policy is based.
Fortunately for our purposes, this response is relatively strong, stable
across time periods, and insensitive to different specifications of the vector
autoregressiverepresentation. The response function we will use in corxputing
an optimal control policy is shown below in Figures 3,)4,5,asestimated
undera variety of alternative specifications.Notice how little variation
there is in the shape of this response in the different systems. Also notice
how long lived is the response of money to the funds rate shock. Significant
decreases in the money stock continue to occur two months after the initial
shock.
Notonly did the federal funds rate significantly improve the
prediction of M—1, but it also explains a dramatically larger share of the
variation of M—1 than any of the other variables considered. In the sets of
three variable systems in Table 1, the percentage of the one—year—ahead fore-
cast variance explained by innovations in the funds rate varied between 19and
73percent.The largest share received by any of the other variables con-
sidered was 1percent,and in several cases itwasless than 1percent.In
Figure6weshow the response functions of money in a five variable system
whichadds commercial and industrial loans, borrowed reserves and nonborrowed
reservesto M—l and the funds rate. Notice how much larger is theresponse of
moneyto the funds rate than to any of the other variables. Based on these
results we have proceeded with a bivariate autoregression using only M—1 and
the federal funds rate. All of the subsequent analysis could be generalized
to include other variables in the state vector, but the results would probably
not be iaterially affected.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dynamcialstructure of a control exercise is a departure of this investigation
from the standard econometric approach. Estimation of a structural model was
rejected here because it would have greatly increased the cost and complexity
of the exercise, and it probably would not lead to improved estimates.In
fact, as stressed by Sims (1980), the usual identifying restrictions are
likely to be false, and their application would probably lead to misspecifi—
cation and therefore bias in the estimation of the crucial response
ftnction. Given the strength of the evidence in the data, as seen in the lack
of sensitivity to alternative specifications, the results from using a reason-
able structural model would presumably be similar to those obtained here.
However, the risks of biasing results from imposing false restrictions and
inappropriate specification of rnamic structures appear to far outweigh the
expected benefit from a possible reduction in the variance of the estimates.
Evenif it would not improve the estimates, one might prefer a structural
model ifit wouldbe more likely to remain valid in the face of
interventions.Unfortunately, construction of such an invariant structural
modelis likely to be a difficult task. Moreover, the degree of inadequacy of
the time series representation is not obvious.This issue is addressed at
lengthin the final section of this paper.— 15—
14IMPROVING SHORT—RUM CONTROL OF THE MONEY SUPPLY
Current Fed operating procedures do not applyoptimal control tech-
niques, even though the Fed appears to be trying to solve a problem of the
type which optimal control theory is designed to handle.Therefore, the
solution obtained by current procedures is likely to be suboptimal.It is
possible, in fact, to estimate the tradeoff frontier which measures the
obtainablecombinations of interest rate volatility and expected deviations
from monetary targets, and therefore, to measure the degree to which a change
to an optimal control policy would likely improve operating characteristics.
The tradeoffs which emerge suggest that the Federal Reserve could achieve a
considerable smoothing of interest rates with little or no loss in terms of
money supply control. There does not, however, appear to be iaich room for
reducing the average size of money deviations from target.Moreover, such
reductions would require large fluctuations in interest rates.
In order to discuss these tradeoffs, it is first necessary to moti-
vate the model of short run monetary control suggested here.There are
obvious differences between the earlier discussion of this model, in which the
funds rate is the control, and the usual discussion of current Fed operating
procedures, which stress reserve targets. Those differences, however, may be
more apparent than real. Under current Fed policy there is an implicit role
for the funds rate, and that role is the same as the one which it plays in the
optimal control procedure. The main differences between current policy and
the one suggested here is not the role of the funds rate, but rather that
under current procedures the Fed does not minimize a loss function and does
not optimally take intoaccountthe important lags in the response function of
M—l to shocks in the funds rate.Evidence of this behavior, and the sub—
optimal control it implies, is given below.—i6—
Thisinterpretation of current Fed policy is based on the descrip-
tions of operating procedures published in recent issues of the Federal
Reserve BankofNew York (FRBNY) Quarterly Review, and the February1981Board
of Governors Staff Study, "New Monetary Control Procedures." The following
succinct summary by Richard G. Davis appeared in the Summer 1979 review in an
article, "Broad Credit Measures as Targets for Monetary Policy."
Fundamentally, there are two basic tactical approaches the Federal Reserve
can use to attempt to control the behavior of the money supply or any
other financial variable. One of these would be to attempt to project the
path of bank reserves (or the monetary base) that seems most likely to be
associated with the desired path of the aggregate. The success of this
approach depends, in turn, on the stability and predictability of the
'n.iltiplier'relationship between reserves and the aggregate in
question.Even in the case of monetary definitions involving only cur-
rency and commercial bank deposits, there are significant problems with
regard to the stability and predictability of the relevant niiltipliers.
An alternative tactical approach open to the Federal Reserve in seeking to
control the behavior of financial aggregates involves attempting to esti-
mated the volume of the aggregate the public will want to hold under given
conditions of aggregate demand and interest rates, then seeking to
influenceshort—term money market rates accordingly. This approach also
poses veryrealproblems even in the case of a monetary aggregate because
ofdifficulties in estimating what the public's demand for money will be
under given conditions.
Shortly after this was written the Fed announced that it would
change operating procedures from the second alternative, the funds targeting
approach, to the first alternative, the reserves targeting approach.There
are certainly important differencesin these two approaches, 'outin oneimpor-
tant respectthey are similar.The similarity is that in both cases the
controlvariablewhich directly affects the money supply is the federal funds
rate.That this is true is not always obvious from Federal Reserve System
descriptions, for instance, the one above.However, careful reading of the
following passage from a staff report published as, "Monetary Policy and Open
Market Operations in 1980," in the Summer 1981 FRBNY Quarterly Review makes
thisclear.— 17—
Asthe Desk worked to achieve the average nonborrowed reserve path,
borrowing at the discount window and money market rates tended to adjust
whenever money growth deviated from the Committee's short—term aggregate
objectives. flien money growth was above these objectives, for example, as
in the autumn of 1980, banks demand for total reserves exceeded the
nonborrowed reserve path by more than the initial borrowing assumption.
Hence, with the Desk supplying nonborrowed reserves in line with the path,
interest rates tended to move higher as banks were forced to seek greater
access to the discount window to meet their reserve requirements. These
resulting changes in money market rates under the reserve approach, in
turn, worked to encourage banks and the public to make the portfolio
changes needed to return money growth in time back in line with the
Committee's objectives.
On occasion, as seemed appropriate, the nonborrowed reserve path
was modified relative to the total reserve path in order to accelerate the
adjustment process.These changes were intended to encourage an even
sharper response in borrowing, and hence in reserve availability and
interestrates, to monetary deviations so that the pressures for restoring
money growth in line with the Committee's objectives were intensified.
Noticethat the logic of the following description of the casual
chain between the Fed's nonborrowed reserve target and the money supply gives
a crucial role to the funds rate. The funds rate is never mentioned, but at a
given discount rate, the funds rate is closely tied to the level of bor—
rowings. The description is from another FRBNY Quarterly Review article, "The
Monetary Base as an intermediate Target for Monetary Policy," by Richard G.
Davis in the Winter 1979/80 issue.
In the short—run context, a critical point is that member bank excess
reserves tend to average close to frictional minima over a period of
weeks and to show little systematic sensitivity to interest rate
movements. Consequently, movements in the total reserve component of
the base tend largely to mirror movements in required reserves. And
in the short period of a few weeks between FOMC meetings, required
reserve movements tend to be only marginally responsive to the volume
of nonborrowed reserves supplied. The volume of reserves supplied
throughopen market operations, in the short run, mainly affects the
extent to which member banks are forced to meet their reserve
requirements through borrowings at the discount window. The effect
on total reserves, nonborrowed plusborrowings, and on the total
monetarybase appears to be quite smallover these short periods.
Clearly,then, whether the focus is directly on the funds rate, or
on reserve targets, the fundamental link between the open market operations— 18—
andtheir affect on the money supply is through their affect on the funds
rate.
Moreover, the Open Market Committee and the Desk recognize that
there is a fundamental tradeoff between the rapidity of reduction of short—run
deviations in money and volatility of interest rates. Quoting again from the
report in the Summer 1981 FRBI'TY Quarterly Review:
[The Committee] tried to take into account lags in the effects of changes
in financial market conditions on money growth.A more aggressive
approach to setting short-term monetary targets——say, one that attempted
close month—to—month control——risked the possibility of whipsawing the
markets and ultimately destablizing money growth and interest rates over a
longer period.
A recent staff study, Tinsley, von zur Muehlen, Trepeta, and Fries
(1981), addressed the question of whether there exists
"...a well—behaved tradeoff between the volatility of deviations of M—1A
from long—run targets and volatility of short—term interest rates under
current and alternative operating procedures that may be exploited by
short—run monetary policy?"
The Tinsley, et al., studyinvolved simulationsof the Board's
monthly money market model. Although their conclusions are similar to those
reached here, their approach differs in that they did not adopt an explicit
control theoretic framework, nor did they try to model the week—to—week
dynamics of the money market.
Theoptimal control approach to monetary control outlined above is
an attempt to formalize the Fed's operating procedures and the implicit loss
functionwhich trades off short—run control for interest rate smoothness.
Applying time series techniques to the estimation of the laws of motion of the
M—l, federal funds process formalizes the Committee's attention to the lags
inherent in the system.Because the Committee is, in effect, attempting to
solve the same problem, but without the benefit of optimal control theory and
time series analysis, its solution is likely to be suboptimal.— 19—
Althoughit mayatfirst appear to be a funds rate targeting pro-
cedure, the control approach suggested here should not be thought of as either
a funds rate or a reserves targeting procedure. As is stressed above, both of
these operating procedures affect the level of the money supply through the
funds rate. The feedback rule defined here is thus a necessary ingredient for
either operating procedure to function optimally.As explained below,
according to the model presented here the use of a funds targeting procedure
is likely to reduce the losses incurred using an optimal control approach.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the Fed might want to implement a
control policy under a reserves targeting procedure, at least initially.
First of all, if the Fed were obviously pegging the funds rate, it might
become politically impossible for the Fed to set the rate at the levels deter-
mined to be optimal according to the control rule. Secondly, switching back
to funds rate targeting procedure would be an obvious change in policy. The
more smoothly a feedback rule such as this is implemented, the more likely it
is that the money market will respond as it has in the past. This stability
in response is a key issue which is discussed below. Another argument against
switching back to a funds rate targeting approach is that it might send just
the wrong signal concerning the Fed's intentions to control themoney
supply. Any possible signal that it has lost the ability or the desire to
control the supply of money could raise inflation expectations, and conse-
quently the level of interest rates. The operation of the feedback rule under
a reserves targeting procedure would not be that nuich different from current
procedures. Today, the FOMC picks target ranges for the funds rate and money
growth rates, which the Board and the Desk translate into reserve path
targets.Under an optimal control approach, the Board and the Desk could
compute reserve targets on a week—by—week basis, consistent with the funds— 20—
rategiven by the feedback rule. As long as the Fed is willing to cause the
federal funds rate to move as needed to control the money supply, the differ-
ence between a funds and a reserves targeting procedure is not sharp. A class
of possible rules can be defined in terms of the frequency with which the
reserves target is adjusted.The funds and reserves target procedures dis-
cussed here are two possible points in this class. In the limit as a reserves
target is adjusted more and more often to reach a desired level for the funds
rate, it becomes a funds targeting procedure.
The time series model that drives the analysis to follow is a bivar—
late autoregressive representation for M—l and the funds rate. Twelve lags of
eachvariable and a constant term areincluded in each equation. The model is
estimatedusingweekly data from 1976:1 through 1982:12.The estimation
procedure is Theil's (1971) mixed estimation procedure, applied equation 'by
equation,that is, ordinary least squares with the data sets augmented to
include a set of observations representing a Bayesian prior of the type
describedby Litterman (1981). A schematic representation of this prior is
given below.
The estimation was carried out using the Regression AnalysisofTime
Series program of Doan and Litterman (1981). Using their notation, the prior
is a Symmetric RandomWalk with parameter 1. (each variable in each equation
istreated symmetrically, the coefficient on the own firstlag has a mean of
1.,all other coefficients have a mean of o.),andthe lag decay is harmonic
with parameter 2. (the prior for the coefficient on lag j is centered around
0. with a standard error i/j2 times the standard error on the first lag). The
overall tightness is .5 (the standard deviation of the prior distribution for
the first lag of the dependent variable is .5)Theprior standard deviations





























































































































































































standarderror of univariate equations in order to take account of the
different units of the variables. The prior waschosenbased on an informal
search over the parameters of the prior for those which led to the best out—
of—sample forecasts.
The coefficient estimates from this procedure can be viewed as an
approximation of the posterior mean using this prior.These estimates are
given in Table 2.It is not very enlightening to analyze the autoregressive
representation directly, however, so we also present the moving average, or




OBSERVATIONS 318 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 317
R**2 0.99933269 RBAR**2 0.99933269
SSR 14148.140716 SEE 1.1893)417
DtJRBII'T—WATSON 1.971448638
LABEL LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR T-STATISTIC SIGNIF LEVEL
********
N—i 1 .9061776 .05330237 17.00070 .0000000
N—i 2 .0213272 .06180319 .314508 .730031)4
M—1 3 .0096618 .042148938 .22739 .8201172
M—1 14 .0601479 .027811)498 2.16009 .0076505
N—i 5 .01214172 .019114333 .648614 .5165686
M—1 6 —.00141191 .013759145 —.29937 .76146562
N—i 7 .00214200 .01027570 .23551 .81380914
N—i 8 .0039907 .007914580 .50225 .61514915
M—1 9 .0020050 .00632180 .31716 .75111714
M—1 10 —.0003031 .005114480 —.05892 .9530122
M—1 11 .0010058 .00426550 .23581 .81357141
N—i 12 .0010862 .00359225 .30239 .7623510
FundsRt1 —.2781385 .1170627 —2.37597 .01750214
FundsRt2 —.0838023 .1467635 —.57100 .5679978
Funds Rt 3 .0720601 .09146666 .76119 .41465383
Funds Rt 14 .05914890 .0605398 .98264 .3257835
Funds Rt 5 .0199801 .0409899 .1487143 .6259468
Funds Rt 6 .0062840 .0293273 .211427 .83033147
Funds Rt 7 .0078717 .0219227 .35906 .71951457
Funds Rt 8 .0087101 .0169927 .51257 .6082456
Funds Rt 9 .0079570 .0135439 .587149 .5568700
Funds Rt 10 .0017977 .01101415 .16281 .8706652
Funds Rt 11 .0015909 .0091669 .17355 .8622129
Funds Rt 12 .0009123 .0077300 .11802 .9060515
Constant —3.3914371 1.0401465 —3.26236 .OOiiO148— 23—
EQUATION 2 Funds Rt
OBSERVATIONS 318 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 317
R**2 0.98782615 RBAR**2 0.98782615
SSR 78.194197 SEE 0.49665822
DtJRBIN—WATSON 1.93821134
LABEL LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR T—STATISTIC SIGNIF LEVEL
********
M—1 1 —.0852225 .022258 —3.828751 .0001287
M—1 2 .1214743 .025808 4.706767 .0000025
M—1 3 —.0125290 .017743 —.706130 .48oio68
M—1 4 .0019431 .011627 .167115 .8672795
M—1 5 —.0093251 .007994 —1.166508 .2434091
M—1 6 —.0032406 .005745 —.563998 .5727552
M—1 7' —.0022331 .004291 —.520432 .6027623
M—1 8 —.0012125 .003318 —.365431 .7147893
M—1 9 —.0012527 .002639 —.474521 .6351284
M—1 10 —.0012026 .002148 —.559774 .5756330
M—1 11 —.0007926 .001781 —.445011 .6563117
M—1 12 —.0005638 .001500 —.375901 .7069903
Funds Rt 1 1.132931 .048884 23.17576 .0000000
Funds Rt 2 —.115426 .061287 —1.88337 .0596491
Funds Rt 3 —.034741 .039531 —.87881 .3795010
Funds Et 4 —.013489 .025280 —.53357 .5936380
Funds Rt 5 —.013964 .017117 —.81579 .4146150
Funds Rt 6 —.592274 .012246 —.48361 .6286599
Funds Rt 7 —.006550 .009154 —.71554 .4742718
Funds Rt 8 —.003452 .007096 —.48650 .6266065
Funds Rt 9 —.001838 .005655 —.32502 .7451603
Funds Rt 10 —.001819 .004610 —.39453 .6931848
Funds Rt 11 —.001120 .003828 —.29275 .7697113
Funds Rt 12 —.000753 .003228 —.23337 .8154665
Constant —1.469521 .434488 —3.38218 .0007191'IIt
IItI
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Thestate vector for this exercise includes 12 lags of M—1, 12 lags
of the federal fundsrate,a constant, and a money target.
x(t) [m(t),m(t-l),...,m(t—12),r(t),r(t-1),...,r(t—12),1.,Mt)J
The equation of motion is given by:
x(t) =Ax(t—1) +Bu(t) +w(t)
where u(t) F x(t—l)
defines the control. The control, u(t), is a scalar variable defined as a
linear combination of the previous state vector by the feedback vector F. The
vector F is generated by the solution of the matrix Riccati equation. B is a
vector of zeros with a one as the 13th element, corresponding to the element
r(t) in the state vector. Th vector w(t) has zeros everywhere except in its
first and 13th elements, which are white noise error terms with covariance
matrix equal to the estimated covariance matrix of the residuals from the
post—October 1979 data. This covariance matrix is as follows:
Table 3
Covariance Matrix of Innovations
M-1 Funds Rt
M—1 1.blOl .1298
Funds Rt .1298 .2I59
Correlation .2205
The matrix A is given below:
a(1,l) a(1,2) ...a(l,12) a(1,13) 1(1,21)a(1,25)0.
1. 0. ... 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 1. ... 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
a(2,1)a(2,2) a(2,12) a(2,13) a(2,21)a(2,25)0.
0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
C. c. o. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. g—25—
whereg is the targeted growth rate of moner(on a week to week basis). The
a(i,j) are the coefficients from the time series model described above which
determines m(t) and r(t) as a function of the lagged state.
This control model corresponds to a world in which the Fed at the
beginning of the week picks a shock, u(t), which it does not modify as the
week progresses.It is designed to model a reserves targeting procedure in
which the level of nonborrowed reserves to supply during the week is chosen so
as to cause an optimal movement in the funds rate. Because there are unfore-
seen shocks during the week, given by w(t), the funds rate has a stochastic
element which is not under the Fed's control.
In order to model a funds rate targeting procedure, the state vector
is augmented to include the next disturbance to the funds rate equation. The
A matrix is augumented by a column which is zeros except for a one in the 13th
row, corresponding to the funds rate equation.This inclusion is a device
which allows the feedback rule to respond to the disturbance during the week
in which it occurs. Responding to the disturbance is a way to model an oper-
ating procedure in which the funds rate is targeted each week and reserves are
supplied or demanded by the Fed as necessary to keep the rate within a narrow
band.In this approach the only difference between a reserves targeting
procedure and a funds rate targeting procedure is that under the funds rate
procedure the Fed can respond to the disturbance, whereas under the reserve
procedure it cannot. Thus, using this approach implies that there will always
be more noise under a reserves targeting procedure.
To this point, no mention has been made of the fact that the money
supply is not observed contemporaneously with the funds rate. For the purpose
of optimal control, there is an important separation of' the problem of setting
a control from the problem of observing the current state. For a statement of—26--
this result, see Bertsekas (1976).The implication of this result is that
when one or more of the most recent observations of money are not available,
the optimal strateg,r is to form the best linear prediction of these values of
money, and then to proceed as if they had been observed. In practice, depend-
ing on the dayofthe week, the lag between the observation of the fundsrate
and M—l varies between 7 and 12 business days. We model this as a two—week
lag in the weekly data.Thus, we proceed in two steps.First we form the
optimal linear forecast of the most recent two weeks of money data, then we
proceed as above. The forecasting exercise is conditional on the two advanced
observations on the funds rate. The optimal linear forecasting procedure in
this case is described in Example 13.5 of Doan and Litterman (1981).The
astute reader will have realized that the conditional forecast depends on the
reduced form, which is a function of the feedback control rule; but the feed-
back control rule itself is a function of the conditional forecast.Thus,
using this forimilation with two unobserved values of money in the state vec-
tor, the problem of finding the optimal control rule requires a simultaneous
solution with the problem of generating a conditional forecast. Actually, the
problem is not all that serious. The method described below has worked quite
well with a minimum additional computing expense.
The solution procedure is a simple iteration. The reduced form in
the first step is derived by solving the matrix Riccati equation for a feed-
back control vector, F, and plugging it into the state equation.
x(t) =(A—BF)x(t-1•) +w(t)
The conditional forecast of x(t—l) given a subvector of x(t—1) can be written
as
x(t—l)G x(t—1) (5)
where G is a matrix which has zeros in the columns corresponding to the— 27—
unobservedcomponents of x(t—l). Given G, the new reduced form, that is the
reduced form for step two is
x(t) =(A—BFG)x(t—l) +w(t) (6)
Thisreduced form implies a new G, and so on. Note that each iteration adds
two lags to the state vector.Thus, in principle, the reduced form has an
infinite autoregressive representation.In practice, within the relevant
range of A's iterating between these two equations quickly leads to conver-
gence of G and the reduced form transition matrix, (A—BFG). Notice that this
iterative procedure does not require repeated solution of the matrix Riccati
equation, which determines F.We illustrate the reduced form response of
moneyand the funds rate to an innovation in money in Fiires 8through13 for
funds rate and reserve targeting procedures and several values of A and q.
The response of the funds rate could be viewed as a Fed reaction function
underan optimal control approach.
Several points should be noticed with respect to these graphs.
First, there is a two week lag in the response of interest rates to the money
innovation.This is duetothe delay in the observation of the money inno-.
vation. Because of the differences in the definitions of the loss functions,
the values of A are not comparable between loss functions with different
values of q.For q=12 and the funds targeting procedure graphs representing
several values of A are displayed. As A gets larger more weight is given to
smoothing interest rates; this causes a smaller interest rate response and a
longer delay in returning money to the target path.The main difference
between responses when q=l and q=12 is that in the latter case responses are
moreof adiscrete nature. When longer runsmoothingis desired, he response
toa given shock is to move the funds rate to a new level at which it is
expected to stay, rather than the more gradual increase which is generated



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The shocks have been orthogonalized so that the shock we are calling
a money innovation includes the component of interest rate innovations which
arecorrelated with mon innovations. A comparison of the response patterns
for q=12, X=2, between the fundsrateand reserves targeting procedures shows
thatthe difference between them is that under a funds rate target there is a
contemporaneous offsetting of the funds rate movement associated with the
money innovation. That offsetting response represents the degree to which all
contemporaneous movements in the funds rate are offset; the controller does
not yet recognize the movement as a money innovation.In fact, because the
funds rate movement is equally likely to represent a funds rate innovation
which lowers the expected money path, in the second week the funds rate is
brought essentially back to, or even below, its previous path.It is not
until the third week,whenthe money disturbance is seen by the controller,
and recognized for what it is, that the reaction to it begins.
Once the optirra.l feedback rule has been calculated, taking into
account the lagged observation of money, the probability laws of the control-.
led system are determined and thus we can calculate measures of expected
interest rate volatility and money supply deviations. We can, that is, calcu-
late the set of points, associated with different values of X and q, which
represent the best possible solutions to the problem of minimizing both money
supply deviations and interest rate volatility.The tradeoff can be more
easily understood by visualizing the costs associated with the 1976 to present
period. These costs are illustrated in Figures 114 and 15.In the first, we
showthe money deviations from target. This target does not attempt to repre-
sentactual Fed policy, but rather is estimated as a long run trend. This
assumes the Fed was always basically hitting its long run targets, which
presumablyunderstates the truesituation, particularly prior to October—
1979.For our purposes, which focus on short—run control, this is an adequateFigure 14
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approximation.In fact, the target is estimated as the quadratic trend in the
logged M—l data, and the implied slowly declining growth rates, which are also
shown in the figure, are quite consistent with the stated Federal Reserve
intentions. Finally, in the plot showing the deviations from target we also
showdotted lines at plus and minus the post-.October—1919 root mean square
deviation.The size of this mean square deviation is the measure of monetary
control which enters the loss function.
In the next figure we show the federal funds rate path along with
two plots illustrating how interest rate volatility is measured in the loss
function. One plot shows week—to—week changes in the funds rate, with dotted
lines at plus and minus the post—October—l979root mean square change. This
meansquare change enters the loss function when q=l.In the other plot we
show the square root of the average of squared changes from each of the twelve
previous weeks.This value squared is the measure which enters the loss
function when q=l2.A dotted line shows its post—October—l979 average
value. Notice that while they both have units of basis points, the leveTh of
these measures of loss for q=l and q=12 are not comparable.
Having now defined the appropriate measures of loss, we are able to
present the optin.l tradeoff as a curve in a graph with root mean square money
supply deviations on the vertical axis and root mean square changesin
interest rates (or root of averages of twelve squared changes, for q=12) on
the horizontal axis. Two curves are shown 'in Figures 16 and lT, one for the
model of a funds targeting procedure and one for the model of a reserves
targeting procedure. The size of the shocks is based on the post—October—1979
experience.Notice that lowering the average money deviation from target
below about )..5 billion, which is close to the actual post—October-l979 level,





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aninteresting question is the following:where does the current
policy, represented in this model by the time series representation with no
control applied, leave us in this space? We can answer this question, butthe
curve described above, which represents an average expected performance in a
steady state, is not the best point of departure. The problem is that the
deviations from target of the uncontrolled money path accumulate over time so
that there is no finite steady state expected money deviation. This aspect of
the time series representation for current policy is not a characteristic
about which we should be overly concerned. First of all, the relatively short
segment of weekly data on which it is based does not contain muchinformation
about the long runpropertiesof the system. In the second place, the random
walk prior pulls the estimates toward a nonstationary representation.It is
possible, however, to make a useful performance coirarison in this space
between the optimally controlled systems and the uncontrolled system.This
can be accomplished by generating a kind of psuedo history as describedbelow.
The vector autoregressive representation generates a set of one—
step—ahead forecast errors, or shocks, for the period over which it isesti-
mated. These shocks can be used to answer the question of how much better
could the Fed have done in the past, had it been following an optimal control
policy.First, we need to define a target path for the 1976 to present
period. Since we are focusing on short—run control, we will take asthe long—
runtargetthe downward trending growth path described above.Given the
target, and taking the initial values at the beginning of1976 as given, for
anyparticularvalues of X and q we can generate the paths the state variables
would have taken if:
(a) the state had evolved according to the vector autoregressive
representation,
(b) an optimal control policy had been in force, and— 31—
(c)the same set of shocks had hit the system.
The results of this type of experiment using different values of X
and q, lead to pseudo histories and tradeoff curves representing what would
have occurred under different loss functions and an optimal control
strate.These tradeoff curves can be usefully compared with the actual
performance over the same period.This is done in Figures 18and 19 for the
post-.October-1979period.
Four results stand out from this comparison.
1)Witha loss function that focuses on high frequency vola-
tility (i.e.q=1), there is not rruchlossassociated with
the current policy relative toan optimal reserve targeting
procedure.
2) Second, there is very little possible improvement, under
eitherprocedure, in reducing short run money deviations
from target without incurring large increases in interest
rate volatility.
3) Third, there is a large gain possible with respect to reduc-
ing high frequency interest rate volatility by moving to a
funds ratetargeting procedure.
i)Finally, with respect to a loss function that focuses on
smoothing both high and low frequency movements in interest
rates (i.e. q12), there is a large gain possible through
optimal control of interest rates for either a reserve or a
funds rate targeting procedure.
Another interesting comparison can be made 1y looking directly at
the pseudo histories themselves. These are shown for several values of X and
q in Figures 20 to 25.Notice that comparing the actual movements in the
funds rate with the movements generated by any of the optimal control— 32—
proceduressuggests that the Fed often responds to money deviations with too
much of a delay, and then to react for too long of a period, leading to
signficant overshooting of its M—l targets.Furthermore, a conarison with
thehistory generated with q equal to 12 and X=2 suggests that a considerable
degree of smoothing of the funds rate could have been achieved with no adverse
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Pseudo Hfsiory Comparing Achual WILK Conbrol led
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Conlrolled— 33 —
Inpractice, what the optimalcontrolprocedure gives the policy—
maker each week is a suggestion for where the funds rate should be in the
following week and a set of forecasts for values of the state variables condi-
tionalon the value of the funds rate.Examples of this type of output are
given belowinFigures 26,27, and28.Shown are actual values up the current
time period, the projected paths of the variables if no control is applied,
and the projected paths if the optimal control is applied this period.20-
Figure 26
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5. EVIDENCEO1' STRUCTURAL STABILITY
Thereis no guarantee that changes in the operating procedures of
the Fed would leave unaffected the important dynamics of themoney market on
which this procedure depends.There is evidence which suggests that the
impactwould not be large. Moreover, there are reasons to think a structural
model ofthe link between the funds rate and the money supply could be con-
structed in which that response would not be sensitive to the kinds of inter—
ventions we have been considering.
A key assumption of the above exercise is that the dynamics of the
money market variables would not change too much as a result of the adoption
of an optimal control rule.Whether this is likely to be true is a key
question, it is, after all, the focus of the rational expectations criticism
of traditional econometric exercises of this type. According to the rational
expectations argument, changes in the policy rule of the government will lead
to changes in the actions of agents in the econon and the new dynamic
behavior of the econon is likely to be far different from before.For a
forceful exposition of this viewpoint, see Lucas (1976).
The standard answer to the above question is that the dynamic
behavior of the econonr can be modeled structurally, and equations such as a
consumptionfunction, a money demand function, and so on, represent behavior
ofagents which will not changewhenthe equation representing the policy rule
is changed.However, ifit is recognized that agents' behavior depend cru-
ciallyonexpectationsof the future, which in turn depend on government
policy, then unless expectations have been explicitly modeled, this defense
breaks down.Since a time series representation is the reduced form implied
by a structural model, the dynamics of the time series representation are
subject to the Lucas critique.— 35—
Ina draft of his forthcoming Brookings paper,Sims challenges the
relevance of the Lucas critique, for policy choices ofthe type being
considered here. Because it is a key issue, we quote at length.
The normai business of policy formation is properly thoughtof as
choice of shocks to the policy behavior equation, or equivalentlyas
choice of values for policy variables, or again equivalently as
implementation of an unchanged policy rule. Itis an analytically
nontrivial problem, given that the structure of the economyis
subject to continual uncertain drift and thatthose with actual
influence on policy are engaged in a complicated dynamic gamewith
many players. It is fully as important asthe problem of choice of
policy rule. Though choice of rule has permanent consequences,while
choice of the current level of policy variables has moreshort—lived
consequences, choice of current levels is repeated veryoften, while
choice of rule must occur rarely. The cost of using a poormethod
for making the choice are therefore of comparable magnitude.
Finally, statistical methods probably have more tocontribute to
policy choices which do not involve rule changes.This may seem to
conflict with the recent flowering of econometric literature
connected with rational expectations. But while choice of policy
rule requires sophisticated probabilities modeling, andwhile
econometric estimation of parameters structural under changesin rule
is an intellectual challenge, it remains true thatrule changes must
be rare events. To make statistics yield conclusionsabout the effects
of rule changes requires laying the data over a dense, inevitably
controversial scaffold of a priori theorizing. Since
choices of shocks to policy equations have occured very often,the
data can be expected to speak more directly about their consequences.
Interesting and important as it may be to developmethods
for optimally choosing policy rules in the face of the Lucas
critique, it is a mistake to suppose that thisshould be the
exclusive, or even the main focus of quantitativelyoriented
macroeconometric research. The normal business of making projections
of the likely effects of various choices for the pathsof policy
variables is neither internally inconsistent, nor analytically
trivial, nor inconsequential.
With respect to the money market, we are in the fortunatecircum-
stanceof having one bit of empirical evidence which may beof help in resol-
ving this issue. InOctober 1979 theFederal Reserve madea change in opera-
ting procedures which arguably was a more strikingchange than would be the
adoption of the optimal control techniques proposedhere. If the dynamics of
the system were not affected too much by that change,then there is good
reason to hope that they would not be too sensitiveto the change proposed— 36 —
here.Unfortunately, testing for structural change can be a tricirpropo—
sition.For example, it is obvious from the data thatsomething changed in
October 1979.The standard errors of innovations in M—l and the fundsrate
are many times larger after that date.For our purpose, the question of
interest, however, is whether there is evidence that theresponse function of
M—l to a shock in the fundsratechanged. On this question, the evidence is
comfortably unclear.Based on visual inspection of the response functions
presented above, and a statistical test described here, there isno reason to
believe that the response of money changed significantly whenthe operating
procedures of the Fed were changed. This test is as follows:one—step—ahead
forecasts of money were made separately based on the data beforeand after the
change. The forecasts were made out—of—sample, in a sense to be madeprecise
below. If there was a significant change in structure, thenmaking forecasts
based on using the full sample should lead to largererrors in both sub—
samples. iflfact,using 12 lags, the forecasts of money in the first half of
the sample improved only marginally after dropping thesecond half, and the
forecasts in the second half actually improved using estimatesbased on the
fullsample.Using two lags, the forecasts based on the full sample were
better in each subsample than the forecasts based on thesubsample alone. The
out—of—sample nature of the test is that for each period, the forecast of
money for that period is based on an estimator using all observations in the
relevant sample except that period's observation. The reason for thisproce—
dure is that if the test is done in—sample, then the subsample estimatesn.zst
fitbetter.One version ofthestandard Chow test for structural stability is
basedon the asymptotic distribution of the size of this in—sample improve-
ment. See, for example, Sims (1980).Asymptotically,ourtestwill have the
same distribution. The fact that there is little ornoimprovement in the two




Prediction Error Prediction Error
Based on Subsample Based on Full Sample
Period (Billions) (Billions)
(Estimated Using 2 Lags)
76,13 to 79,10 .58173 .51186
80,1 to 82,12 1.65326 1.6)4932
(Estimated Using 12 Lags)
76,13 to 79,)40 .59865 .6o660
80,1 to 82,12 1.73695 1.60863
An important element in any argument of why the responseof money to
the funds rate would not be likely to change under a changein operating
procedures should be based on an understandingof that response. Banks play a
kr role in the reaction of money to changesin the funds rate. That role is
described in a recent paper, "A Critique of theFederal Reserve's New
Operating Procedure" by Robert D. Laurent ofthe Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago.
The money supply process is the means by which themonetary authority
affects the purchase and sale of assets by banks andthereby the creation
and destruction of deposits. It may be thought of as a two—step
process.The first step isthe action of the Fed. The second step is the
reactionofthe banks to the Fed's actions. The linchpin ofthe money
supplyprocess is the federal funds market.The federal funds market both
resisters the actions of the Fed by setting the priceof reserve credit
andtransmits its influenceto every bank. The individual bank's response
interms of buying assets from, or selling assets tothe public is what
determines the change in deposits and money. To theindividual bank, it
is the federal funds rate and not reserves whichdetermines how it changes
its asset holdings and its impact on the aggregatelevel of deposits. The
individual bank neither knows nor cares about the aggregatelevel of
reserves in the banking system.Indeed, it can be argued that even its
own levelof reserves does not determinewhether a bank buys orsells
assets,creating or destroying deposits.Of course, a bank must have
enoughreserves to meet reserve requirements, but it can alwaysobtain or
dispose of reserves in the federal funds market.For example, even a bank
deficient in reserves might still make loans and therebyincrease deposits
if the rate on loans were high relative to thefederal funds rate.It
would offset its loss of reserves resulting from theincrease in loans by
buying even more funds than otherwise in thefederal funds market. The
bank'sresponse depends entirelyupon what appears profitable,not upon—38—
thecircumstances of the bank'sreserveposition.The effect of the federalfunds rate on individual banksandthe aggregate level of deposits
is clear. Other things equal, the higher (lower) thefederal funds rate,
the lower (higher) will be the level of deposits. Toan individual bank,
the federal funds market can be either asource of, or an outlet for,
funds.A bank compares the federal funds rate to the rateson assets
available from the public.The lower the federal funds rate, themore
attractive these other assets look. With a low federal fundsrate, banks
respond by increasing their holdings of assets obtained from thepublic,
creating deposits and covering any reserve losses with federalfunds
purchases.Conversely, a high federal funds rate means that banks will
reducetheir holdings of assets obtained from thepublic, destroying
deposits, and take the reserves acquired and sell them in thefederal
funds market....A bank actually compares (afteradjusting for risk differ-
ential and transaction costs) the rate on an asset of'a given maturity
with the expected rate on one day federal funds rolledover for the same
maturity.Thus, equilibrium is not necessarily where the rateon bank
assest equals the federal funds rate.Policy affects the money stock
throughthe impact of the current federal funds rateon expected future federal funds rates.The greater is the impact of a movement in the
current federal funds rate on expected future fundsrates, the greater is theimpact onmoney.
If this understanding of the response iscorrect, then money should
continueto react in essentially the same way it has in thepast in response
to a given movement in the funds rate. Ifany difference can be expected, it
is likely to be that the response will become larger andquicker because given
movements in the funds rate will carry more information about futuremovements
in the funds rate than at present, particularly ifpeople understand and
believe the Fed's linear feedback rule. Such a change instructure would have
the beneficial effect of causing the tradeoff curves definedabove to shift
down and toward the left. To make this arment precise wouldrequire a model
of the equilibrium structure which would result from interactionof a Fed
policy rule of the sort suggested here and banks' optimizing behaviorsubJect
to some costs of adjustment. Such an investigation wouldappear to be a good
topic for future research.— 39 —
CONCLUSION
This application of optimal control theory and time series analysis
has identifiedan important tradeoff between degrees ofshort-run monetary
control andinterest rate volatility. Two principal conclusions emerge:
1) Application of optimal controltheory would likely improve Federal
Reserveoperating procedures, and
2) Interest rate volatility can be reduced considerably from current
levels without adversely affecting the degree of monetary control
achieved.— 140—
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